We design an efficient mode of operation on block ciphers, SS-NMAC. Our mode has the following properties, when instantiated with a block cipher f to yield a variable-length, keyed hash function H:
Introduction
Most primitives in symmetric-key cryptography are built from block ciphers, such as AES. Typically, one models the block cipher as a fixed-input-length (FIL) pseudorandom permutation (PRP), and then builds a more complex variable-input-length (VIL) primitive under this assumption. For many such VIL primitives, like pseudorandom functions (PRFs), this strong assumption on the block cipher is justifiable. One exception here is the design of message authentication codes (MACs): since the resulting primitive only needs to be unpredictable, it would be highly desirable to only assume that the block cipher is unpredictable as well, as opposed to pseudorandom. Indeed, it seems that assuming the block cipher is unpredictable is a much weaker assumption than assuming full pseudorandomness: to break the latter, all one needs to do is to predict one bit of "random-looking" information about the block cipher with probability just a little over 1/2, while the former requires one to fully compute the value of the block cipher on a new point with non-trivial probability. Thus, it is natural to ask the following central question of this work: Question 1 Can one build an efficient variable-input-length MAC from a block cipher which is modeled as an unpredictable permutation (UP) on n-bits?
We will argue that no existing constructions are really satisfactory for achieving this natural goal. In order to discuss this precisely, we briefly recall some key quantities which determine the security of a construction. In this paper we consider only two types of adversaries: distinguishers, whose goal is to distinguish a function from an ideal primitive (as for PRFs and PRPs) and forgers, whose goal is to predict the value of the function on an un-queried message (as for MACs and UPs). As there often exist constant-query attacks using very long messages, the most important measure of an adversary's efficiency is the total length of messages that it queries. This upper bounds, among others, the number of queries made by the adversary. For functions that are built from a smaller primitive (such as, in all the cases we consider, a permutation), a more convenient efficiency measure is the number of queries one must make to the smaller primitive in order to evaluate the adversary's queries. In this section we let q stand for the latter number, as opposed to the number of queries actually made by the adversary to its oracle.
Let C be a function built from a block cipher f . The security 1 ε = ε(q) of C is the maximum advantage of an adversary for which the number of calls to f necessary to compute the adversary's queries to C does not exceed q. Thus, lower ε implies better security. We write ε mac and ε prf to distinguish the security C as MAC and PRF, respectively. Likewise the block cipher has a security ε up and ε prp as a UP and as PRP, respectively. 2 The rate of a VIL-function C is the number of times the block cipher has to be called on each input block, so it measures the efficiency of C. We can now rephrase our goal as follows. Given a block cipher f with UP security ε up , construct a VIL-MAC C such that:
(a) C has small constant rate; (b) the security ε mac of C is as small as possible as a function of ε up .
A good way to quantify the "goodness" of ε mac is to assess the maximum q for which the achieved bound is meaningful, assuming that the block cipher has ideal security ε up ∼ 1/2 n as an unpredictable permutation. For example, if ε mac = O(ε up · q 2 ), then the bound is meaningful for q up to ∼ 2 n/2 , which matches the classical birthday bound typically achieved when one models the block cipher as a PRP. As argued by Preneel and van Oorschot [17] , a simple extension attack shows that the birthday security is the best security one may hope to achieve by natural "iterative" constructions. On a positive, several elegant (iterative) constructions matching this bound are known, when modeling the block cipher as a PRP. On a negative, no existing constructions, iterative or otherwise, come even close to the birthday security when assuming UPs as opposed to PRPs. Thus, our "golden standard" to answer Question 1 will be to solve Question 2 Build an (iterative) VIL-MAC from UPs, having constant efficiency rate and (nearly) birthday security.
Jumping ahead, this will be our main result, therefore resolving the main open question of Dodis et al. [8] from Eurocrypt 2008. But first, let us survey what is known, to better understand the difficulties we will have to face, and also motivate our approach.
Inapplicability of Existing Solutions
There is a huge number of proposals for building a VIL-MAC out of a block cipher. Unfortunately, it turns out that most of them are insecure when instantiated with unpredictable block ciphers, -often despite having simple proofs of security when one models the block cipher as a PRP, -and the few that are secure, achieve extremely poor rate and/or security. In order to keep the present discussion focused, we give a detailed listing of many "failed" approaches in Appendix A, here concentrating only on the highlights relevant to our actual approach.
In brief, the existing approaches in question include the following: (1) generic route from unpredictability to pseudorandomness [11, 14] ; (2) CBC-MAC [4, 15] ; (3) HMAC/NMAC [3, 6] ; (4) various ad-hoc methods (e.g., iterating the truncated version of the block cipher); (5) hash-then-MAC using (almost) universal hashing [3, 5] ; (6) hash-then-MAC using collision-resistant hashing; (7) Feistel Network [9, 12] ; and (8) the current best method called "enhanced CBC" mode [8] . Of these, approaches (2) , (3), (4) and (5) are completely insecure when instantiated with generic UPs (as opposed to PRPs!). This is simple to see for (3) , (4) and (5), and was shown by An and Bellare [2] for the CBC-MAC (approach (2) ). The generic approach (1) is secure, but very inefficient, which is not surprising.
Approach (6) , using a collision-resistant hash function (CRHF) H to hash the VIL message before applying a FIL-MAC, also works in principle, but is not satisfactory. In theory, the assumption that CRHFs exist is much stronger than the existence of UPs (or even PRPs); for example, there is a blackbox separation [20] between these assumptions. Even in practice, where many hash functions are built from block ciphers (and analyzed in the ideal cipher model [7, 16] ), the resulting hash functions appear to require a larger security parameter than the "stand-alone" block ciphers they are built from. For example, while the industry standard AES has input length 128, no existing hash function with 128-bit output is considered secure (e.g., MD5 and related functions are broken [21] ); in fact, NIST does not recommend using any hash function with output size below 256, including 160-bit SHA-1.
Weak Collision-Resistance. Thus, we would like to base security of the "hash-then-mac" approach on weaker hash functions than CRHFs. As was demonstrated by [6] , the precisely correct notion for this task is that of Weak Collision Resistance (WCR). Such hash functions H are keyed, and their key is part of the secret key for the resulting VIL-MAC. In terms of security, it should be infeasible for the attacker to come up with distinct inputs x and y such that H(x) = H(y), even when given oracle access to H. An and Bellare [2] then showed that WCR hash functions have similar properties to CRHFs: in particular, the (strengthened) Merkle-Damgard transform gives a VIL-WCR hash function from a FIL-WCR hash function, which can then be used in "hash-then-mac" approach. Moreover, both security reductions are tight for our purposes.
Thus, to efficiently answer Question 1, it is sufficient to build a fixed-input-length sufficiently compressing (say, two-to-one) WCR hash family. Indeed, this is the route of all existing solutions (e.g., approaches (7) and (8)), as well as our solution. However, to also answer Question 2 would additionally require a WCR hash with birthday security, which was not known prior to this work.
Building WCR from UP. This question appears to be non-trivial. In fact, many of the failed approaches above, such as (2), (3), (4) and (5) , not only fail to give a shrinking MAC already on two-block messages, but also fail to yield a WCR hash. (Note, a shrinking MAC is also WCR [2] .) In particular, only two secure solutions were known prior to this work (approaches (7) and (8) above). First, Dodis and Puniya [9] showed how to construct a two-to-one FIL-WCR from ω(log κ) independent UPs, where κ is the security parameter. The construction applied ω(log κ) rounds of the Feistel Network π(x y) = (y f (y) ⊕ x) to the 2n-bit input, each with a different UP f , and then truncated the last output in half. Moreover, they showed that O(log κ) rounds are generally insufficient for this task (extending the three-round counter-example of [2] , and in sharp contrast to the setting of PRPs, where three rounds are already enough [12] ). This means that the resulting super-constant rate ω(log κ) of this particular construction cannot be improved, making it somewhat inefficient for practice. More significantly, the security of this construction proven by [9] was only O(ε up · q 6 ), meaning that it can only be secure for at most 2 n/6 messages, which is unacceptable for n = 128.
The best current WCR construction from UPs comes from the work of Dodis et al. [8] , who made the surprisingly simple observation that the function h(x y) = f 1 (x) ⊕ f 2 (y) is a two-to-one, rate-2 WCR hash function, assuming f 1 and f 2 are two independent UPs. This immediately gives a rate-2 VIL-MAC from UPs, which is very efficient, and is the first (and only) constant-rate solution to Question 1 known prior to this work. Unfortunately, the security of this WCR function (and the resulting VIL-MAC) is O(ε up · q 4 ). Moreover, it is easy to see that this bound is actually tight. Thus, the construction can only be secure for at most 2 n/4 messages, again making it fall short of our goal of obtaining security up to 2 n/2 . In fact, this question of achieving "birthday security" 2 n/2 (which is our Question 2) was the main open question posed in [8] .
Our Results
In this work we resolve this question in the affirmative. Concretely, we construct a VIL-MAC, called SS-NMAC, from four independent UPs f 1 , . . . , f 4 , which achieves rate 3 and security ε mac ≈ O(ε up q 2 log 2 (q)), meaning it can be secure for almost 2 n/2 messages. This is the first constant-rate MAC with birthday security built from an unpredictable block cipher. The construction of SS-NMAC is depicted in Figure 2 , where the message is x = x 1 . . . x ℓ .
Our construction uses the WCR approach mentioned earlier: namely, it uses the (strengthened) Merkle-Damgard iteration of the 2n-bit to n-bit compression function F (x y) = f 1 (x) ⊕ f 3 (f 1 (x) ⊕ f 2 (y)), which is shown in Figure 1 . This function was originally suggested by Shrimpton and Stam [19] , who argued that F is collision-resistant with birthday security, assuming that f 1 , f 2 , f 3 are public random functions (i.e., random oracles). In contrast, our main technical result (Theorem 1) shows that this function is (weakly) collision-resistant (with birthday security), even if f 1 , f 2 , f 3 are only (keyed) unpredictable functions.
We note that since any FIL-MAC is FIL-WCR (Lemma 4.4 [2] ) it would suffice to prove the Shrimpton-Stam compression function is a good MAC in order to show it is WCR. However, as explained in Appendix C, the Shrimpton-Stam compression function is not a good enough MAC for our purposes, showing the necessity of directly proving WCR security.
Comparison with [19] . On a technical level, both results appear similar. In both cases, assuming the adversary A has oracle access to f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , one has to argue that A has low chance of finding a collision to F . However, the key difference is that the f i 's are assumed truly random in [19] , whereas we can only assume unpredictable f i 's. In particular, while [19] could directly bound the probability of A finding the collision in F using an information-theoretic argument, we have to build an efficient reduction from the presumed collision-finding attacker A to a UP-forger B forging one of the MACs. It is well known that such information-theoretic arguments often do not have direct analogs in the computational setting. To illustrate this more concretely, let us only discuss the most interesting such difficulty we had to resolve.
The key argument of [19] was a technical calculation, using factorials, binomials and various probability manipulations, that A is unlikely to find an "n-way multi-collision" in the auxiliary function h(x y) = f 1 (x) ⊕ f 2 (y), when f 1 and f 2 are truly random functions. To adapt this (critical) part of the argument to our computational setting, we would have to take an efficient attacker A ′ capable of finding such a multi-collision in h with probability ε, and turn it into a forger B ′ for either f 1 or f 2 , succeeding with probability Ω(ε/q 2 ). As far as we could see, the probability calculations in [19] give no guidance of how to do such a reduction. And, indeed, finding such a reduction required a completely new approach, relating to a natural "balls-and-bins" game that we analyzed (see Lemma 1) , and resulting in a very non-obvious construction of B. We discuss this construction in detail in Section 4.2, only mentioning that it gave us a better understanding of the security of the Shrimpton-Stam compression function, and even implicitly improved the probability calculations of [19] for the special case of truly random functions (corresponding to ε = 2 −n in our reduction). In particular, for the case of random functions we get a convenient closed form of O(q 2 log 2 (q)/2 n ) for the collision resistance of the Shrimpton-Stam compression function, where, as per our convention for this section, q is the total number of block cipher queries allowed (cf. Theorem 1).
Strong PRF preservation. We also notice that our new mode has the following desirable multiproperty preservation guarantee advocated by [8] : if the block cipher is unpredictable, we get a MAC with message security roughly 2 n/2 , while if it happens to be pseudorandom, we get a PRF with message security roughly 2 n/2 . In other words, we expect and hope that practical block ciphers (such as AES) are in fact PRPs with good security. If our hope is correct, we would get a full-fledged pseudorandom function with good security; however, even if the block cipher turns out to be a much better MAC than it is a pseudorandom function, we still get a MAC with excellent security, which could be reassuring for many applications. Details are sketched in Section 5.
More interestingly, even in the setting of PRPs, our SS-NMAC construction yields a more "leakageresilient" VIL-PRF H than the prior constructions. In particular, in Section 6 we show that the resulting PRF is secure even in the so called oracle cipher model, first considered by Dodis et al. [9] . Recall, in the standard model for PRFs, the attacker only learns the output H(x) of the PRF on input x, but does not learn any of the intermediate values, such as the inputs/outputs to the block cipher or any of the chaining variables. Indeed, this secrecy of the intermediate values is completely essential to the security of most standard constructions, such as CBC-MAC or the standard Luby-Rackoff transformation [12] . In other words, these constructions are actually broken in the oracle cipher model, irrespective of the strength of the block cipher used (e.g., even with AES). In contrast, our SS-NMAC construction is a secure VIL-PRF -with (essentially) the same birthday security -even when the attacker learns all the intermediate values needed to obtain H(x), except for what is done inside the actual block-cipher computations. More precisely, even if the attacker learns all the computation history of our SS-NMAC construction on a bunch of points (not including the internals of the block ciphers), the value of the function at any set of non-queried points looks random to the attacker. Thus, as long as the block cipher is implemented in a "leakage-resilient" way, the remaining implementation of SS-NMAC can be completely insecure with respect to side-channel attacks! We believe that the security in the oracle model is quite important, since we envision secure hardware-based implementation of block-ciphers, later composed with much less secure software-based solutions, to yield various more advanced VIL primitives. We also remark that none of the two previous PRF constructions in the oracle cipher model [8, 9] achieved anything close to birthday security.
Summary. To summarize, in addition to yielding a more secure VIL-MAC than prior constructions in the case when ε mac ≪ ε prp , our construction gives a more "leakage-resilient" (and equally secure!) VIL-PRF even when assuming ε prp is nearly as high as ε mac . Moreover, we only pay a small constant factor price in efficiency for these (significant) security enhancements. In Section 7, we briefly discuss whether this slowdown is justifiable in practice, which ultimately calls for more research to understand the gap between unpredictability and pseudorandomness of the existing block ciphers, such as AES.
Security Definitions
We briefly recall the standard security notions for MACs and PRFs. In each case we are interested in resistance to chosen message attacks. For a MAC, an adversary succeeds if it can forge the MAC on an un-queried value. For a PRF, the adversary succeeds if it can distinguish the PRF from a truly random oracle. To measure an adversary's efficiency we count not only the number of oracle queries made but also the time and the total length of queried messages (as the oracles accept variable length inputs). In this section we use the variableq to denote the number of queries made by the adversary to its oracle in order to emphasize the distinction from the variable q used in Section 1, which was defined as the (distinct) number of block cipher calls necessary to evaluate those queries (the adversary does not have direct access to the block cipher). In later sections we maintain the spirit of this convention, usingq for queries made to VIL-functions and q for queries made to FIL-functions (usually block ciphers).
A function family is a map f : {0, 1} κ × Dom(f ) → {0, 1} n where Dom(f ) ⊆ {0, 1} * . The strings in {0, 1} κ are the keys of f and we write f k (x) for f (k, x) for k ∈ {0, 1} κ and x ∈ Dom(f ). The function f k is called a member of f .
For MACs we consider the following game, where A is an adversary with oracle access to f k :
, f k (x) = y and x was not a query of A then A wins, otherwise A looses.
Following An and Bellare [2] we define the insecurity of f as a MAC to be
where the maximum is taken over all adversaries A making at mostq queries whose total combined length is at most µ bits and of "running time" at most t. The "running time" is defined to be the total running time of the experiment, including the time necessary to compute the answers to A's queries.
(The advantage of this definition is that a simulator running A and computing the answer to A's queries from scratch has essentially the same running time t.) For PRF security the game is modified by either giving A access to a random f k or to a random oracle g : Dom(f ) → {0, 1} n with probability 1 2 and A wins if it correctly identifies whether its oracle is f k or g. Call this game 'Identifies(A, f )'. Then
where again the maximum is taken over all adversaries A making at mostq queries of total length µ and of running time t, with the same convention concerning running time.
The proof finally uses the notion of "weak collision resistance" (WCR), which measures the collision resistance of a function only available as an oracle to the adversary. In the weak collision resistance game for the function family f , A is given oracle access to a random f k and wins if it succeeds in querying f k on two distinct points x, y such that f k (x) = f k (y). Then InSec wcr f (t,q, µ) is defined similarly with respect to this game as InSec mac f (t,q, µ) is defined with respect to the game Forge(A, f ).
Figure 1: The Shrimpton-Stam compression function. All wires carry n-bit values.
Figure 2: The SS-NMAC mode of operation.
The SS-NMAC construction
The basic SS-NMAC scheme is shown in Figure 2 . The scheme uses the Merkle-Damgard iteration of the 2n-bit to n-bit compression function of Shrimpton and Stam [19] shown in Figure 1 . We start by describing this compression function.
The Shrimpton-Stam compression function. The Shrimpton-Stam compression function is a 2n-bit to n-bit compression function that uses calls to three different n-bit to n-bit primitives f 1 , f 2 , f 3 . We write the compression function as
for any pair of n-bit strings x, y. Shrimpton and Stam [19] proved that F [f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ] has optimal (i.e. birthday) collision resistance if f 1 , f 2 , f 3 are random functions. They also conjectured that the construction remains collision resistant if f i (x) is replaced with π i (x) ⊕ x where π 1 , π 2 , π 3 are random permutations, which would enable the construction to be implemented with fixed key block ciphers. This conjecture was verified by Rogaway and Steinberger [18] .
For our purposes, the key property of F [f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ] is that an adversary with oracle access to the f i 's can only learn F [f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ](x y) on roughly as many inputs x y as it makes queries. This should be contrasted for example to the compression function h[
of the enciphered CBC construction of Dodis, Pietrzak and Puniya [8] , where f 1 , f 2 are again n-bit to n-bit functions. An adversary querying h[f 1 ] can learn to evaluate h[f 1 ] on 2 n inputs x y in a single query; an adversary querying g[f 1 , f 2 ] can learn to evaluate g[f 1 , f 2 ] on q 2 inputs x y inueries. Another compression function that could be used equally well in place of F [f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ] is the LP231 compression function of Rogaway and Steinberger [18] , which also uses three calls to n-bit to n-bit primitives. However we use F [f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ] because it is simpler and sufficient for our purposes.
Iteration and Padding. First we define PadAp(x) to be x10 k ℓ where k is the least integer such that x10 k has length a multiple of n, where ℓ is the number of n-bit blocks in x10 k , and where ℓ is ℓ written as an n-bit binary integer (messages with maximum length 2 n are sufficient for most applications). Appending ℓ amounts to using Merkle-Damgard strengthening, which we do in order to keep our space of messages suffix-free. Any other suffix-free encoding of messages would do as well.
To iterate
for all x ∈ Dom(H) := {PadAp(y) : y ∈ {0, 1} * }. See Figure 2 , where
] on its domain an adversary must pad the input itself before giving it to the oracle. Thus queries must be at least n bits long and the number of queries made by an adversary is upper bounded by µ/n where µ is the total length of messages queried by the adversary. For the remainder of the paper we let f : {0, 1} κ × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be an arbitrary, fixed function family. We consider H as a function family of signature {0, 1} 4κ × Dom(H) → {0, 1} n , where
4 Security of SS-NMAC as a MAC
Overview
In this section we outline the proof that SS-NMAC is a secure MAC when f 1 , . . . , f 4 are secure MACs. The proof shows that H is a secure MAC family if f is a secure MAC family. In fact,
where q = µ/n (q is inconsequent, though one automatically hasq ≤ q). The O(q 2 n) difference in running time is due to the overhead of a simulator. Like Dodis, Pietrzak and Puniya [8] , our security proof follows the approach developed by An and Bellare [2] , who reduce the VIL-MAC security to FIL-WCR security. In order to summarize their method in a convenient way we refer to the members of a function family as being MAC-secure or WCR-secure (see section 2 for the definition of WCR security) though security is really a property of the function family. An and Bellare reduce the MAC security of a VIL function to the WCR security of a FIL function in two steps:
Step 1: The composition of a secure FIL-MAC f k and a secure WCR function [2] ). Applying this to the case where
Step 2: On a suffix-free domain of inputs the Merkle-Damgard iteration of a FIL-WCR compression function gives a VIL-WCR function (Lemma 4.3 [2] ). Thus, by step 1, it suffices to show that the 
where
in order to prove (1) . Inequality (3) is really the paper's main result, and we state it as a theorem:
The full proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix B, but we give an outline in the next section. Together with Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 of [2] , Theorem 1 implies inequality (3), which we restate as our theorem characterizing the MAC security of SS-NMAC:
Proof Outline
In this section we give a proof of Theorem 1 under several simplifying assumptions, which make our presentation considerably easier, while maintaining the key ideas of the full proof. Recall, we need to upper bound the WCR-insecurity of the Shrimpton-Stam compression function F in terms of the MAC-insecurity of f . Equivalently, we must lower bound the MAC-insecurity of f in terms of the WCR-insecurity of F . To do the latter, we show how an ε-collision-finding adversary A for F can be turned into a δ-MAC-forging adversary B for f , where B uses the same number of queries but has chance of success δ = Ω(ε/q 2 log 2 (q)). First, instead of giving A oracle access to F [f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ], we directly give it oracle access to f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , withueries allowed to each f i . Clearly, such an adversary can simulateueries to F , so we only made A more powerful. (Note, this strengthened attacker will be useful when we extend our argument to the "oracle cipher" model in Section 6.) Let us generally denote the inputs to f 1 , f 2 , f 3 by x, y, z, respectively, and also denote by x 1 . . . x q , y 1 . . . y q and z 1 . . . z q the ordered inputs to f 1 , f 2 , f 3 supplied by A. As expected, the forger B will simulate this adversary A when trying to forge one of the f i 's, by using its own oracle to simulate the corresponding f i , and simulating the other f j 's by picking their secret keys by itself and answering honestly.
Simplifying Assumptions. Before proceeding further, we state our simplifying assumptions on the behavior of A, which will make our construction of B much simpler, while retaining the key ingredients of the general case.
• (No Collision in f i 's) For any distinct inputs x r and x s that A supplied to
Similar conditions also hold for f 2 and f 3 .
• (Query Order) All the calls to f 1 and f 2 are made by A before any call to f 3 is made.
Let us briefly comment on these assumptions. The first assumption regarding the collisions in the f i 's is very minor, and is done for convenience only. Indeed, in the actual applications, the f i 's are permutations, so the assumption is trivially true. And even if the f i 's are arbitrary length-preserving MACs, the failure to satisfy our assumption with probability Ω(ε) trivially leads to a simple attacker B, forging the corresponding f i with probability Ω(ε/q 2 ), by simply guessing the indices r, s ∈ {1 . . . q} of the colliding queries. So the only "real" assumption we make is the Query Order Assumption. This assumption is provably impossible for the "initial" attacker who has oracle access to F [f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ], as opposed to f 1 , f 2 , f 3 (since f 3 will be called on the first call there), and is even more unreasonable for the generalized attacker that can query the f i 's in any order it wants. However the assumption is used in a rather weak way in the proof sketch, as we will see, so that eliminating it only requires additional casework, and no significant new ideas.
Notation and Terminology. A ball is a pair (x, y) where x, y ∈ {0, 1} n . A bin is a value z ∈ {0, 1} n . It is instructive to associate balls (x, y) with the inputs to F , and the bins z with the inputs to f 3 . After A makesueries x 1 . . . x q to f 1 and y 1 . . . y q to f 2 , we get Q = q 2 potential balls (x r , y s ) "thrown" by A. In particular, we will say that such (x r , y s ) is placed into the bin z = f 1 (x r ) ⊕ f 2 (y s ), and let Bin(z) = {(x r , y s ) : f 1 (x r ) ⊕ f 2 (y s ) = z} denote the set of balls placed into bin z. Notice, each query x r to f 1 allows the attacker to simultaneously place j ≤ q balls (x r , y 1 ), . . . , (x r , y j ), where j is the number of queries to f 2 made so far. However, under our No Collision assumption of f 2 , all these j balls go to distinct bins f 1 (x r ) ⊕ f 2 (y s ), where 1 ≤ s ≤ j. Similar discussion holds for the calls to f 2 . Also, under our Query Order Assumption, the attacker A places all Q balls into the appropriate bins in the first stage, before making any of its queries z 1 . . . z q to f 3 in the second stage. And after each such query z t to f 3 , A learns the value of F (x y) = f 1 (x) ⊕ f 3 (z t ) precisely for all (x, y) ∈ Bin(z t ).
Back to Reduction. By our assumption, A will find a collision (x, y) = (x ′ , y ′ ) to F with probability ε. Without loss of generality, we assume that A makes the queries necessary to verify this collision. Thus, x, x ′ ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x q }, y, y ′ ∈ {y 1 , . . . , y q }, and z, z ′ ∈ {z 1 , . . . , z q }, where z = f 1 (x) ⊕ f 2 (y) and
, so y = y ′ , meaning that (x, y) = (x ′ , y ′ ). Hence, the "colliding" bins z and z ′ queried by A must be distinct.
We now define a key parameter which will determine the behavior of our forger B: the maximum bin size m = max z |Bin(z)| after the calls to f 1 and f 2 (the "filling" stage). We consider two complementary cases: (1) A finds a collision and m ≤ log(q), meaning that every bin z contains at most log(q) balls after the calls to f 1 and f 2 are finished; and (2) m > log(q), meaning that A managed to produce more than log(q) pairs (x r , y s ) resulting in the same value z = f 1 (x r ) ⊕ f 2 (y s ).
(Interestingly, this parameter m corresponds to the largest "multi-collision" generated by A in the "filling" stage. As argued by Shrimpton and Stam [19] for the case of truly random functions f i and q ≈ 2 n/2 , the value m must be smaller than n 1+o(1) ≈ log q with high probability, more or less corresponding to saying that the attacker A must almost always be in case (1).)
By assumption that A succeeds to find a collision with probability ≥ ε, at least one of these complementary cases happens with probability ≥ ε/2.
Case (1):
A finds a collision and m ≤ log(q). This is the "easy" case. Intuitively, by querying at most q bins z in the second stage, A learned the value of F in at most qm ≤ q log(q) points (x, y). As we will see, it will allow B to guess the colliding points (x, y), (x ′ , y ′ ) with probability 1/(q log(q)) 2 , and then forge the value
More formally, B starts by choosing two random indices j < i between 1 and q. Let z i , z j be the i-th and j-th queries made to f 3 . When the query f 3 (z i ) is made, B chooses random elements (x i , y i ) ∈ Bin(z i ) and (x j , y j ) ∈ Bin(z j ) (assuming these sets are nonempty, otherwise B gives up), and predicts that
. Notice, this corresponds to guessing that F (x i , y i ) = F (x j , y j ), which implies that A is about to find a collision. This strategy cannot be successful unless A finds a collision (which we are assuming happens in this case), and unless the colliding bins z i and z j are distinct, which we also argued earlier as following from our No Collision assumption. But when A does find a collision, B's chance of guessing the indices i, j correctly is 1/
Case (2):
A produces m > log(q). This is the "hard" case, where our balls-and-bins terminology comes in handy. Intuitively, if A throws q 2 balls with a guarantee that some bin will contain a lot of balls at the end, B should have a non-trivial chance (analyzed below) to guess the bin z corresponding to some ball (x, y) before this ball is thrown. To effect such a guess, when A "throws" the ball (x, y) by querying, say, f 1 (x) after previously querying f 2 (y), B can predict that f 1 (x) = z ⊕ f 2 (y), or conversely with f 1 and f 2 reversed if A queries f 2 (y) after querying f 1 (x). In other words, predicting the output of f 1 or f 2 on a value queried by A is equivalent to predicting the bin where a particular ball (x, y) will land at the point when the latest of the two queries f 1 (x), f 2 (y) is made. Thus, we may view B's task as consisting of observing a set of Q = q 2 balls being placed by groups in 2 n bins, and interrupting the game at some point to predict the bin where a particular ball that is about to be placed. We model this by a "balls-and-bins" game played by A and B, where A is incrementally throwing Q balls into bins, trying to fill some bin with more than log(q) balls, and yet without having B be able to guess the position of a ball before it is placed. Based on our discussion, the precise "rules" of this game are as follows:
Balls-and-Bins Game:
• The game proceeds in 2q rounds, after which A is required to throw exactly Q = q 2 balls.
• Before each round, A announces to B at most q balls b 1 , . . . , b t that it will be throwing into (necessarily) distinct bins in this round. [Intuitively, a round corresponds to a query to f 1 (x r ) (or f 2 (y s )), and the balls are the corresponding values (x r , y j ) (or (x i , y s )) for prior x i 's or y j 's.]
• In turn, B can secretly "pass" or make a "guess" (ℓ, z) that the ball b ℓ will be thrown into bin z (where 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ t).
[Intuitively, a successful guess will allow B to forge either f 1 or f 2 , as outlined earlier.]
• A announces to B the bins where b 1 . . . b t are thrown. [Intuitively, B learns the value of f 1 or f 2 at the queried point, allowing it to learn the bin identities.]
• If B made a guess during this round, B wins the game if the guess is correct, and loses otherwise. If B did not make a guess, proceed to the next round.
• B must make a guess at some round, while A must fill at least one bin with more than (log q) balls.
Lemma 1 Irrespective of A's strategy, there exists an efficient strategy for B to win the above game with probability at least 1/4q 2 whenever some bin contains more than log(q) balls at the end of the game.
Proof. B's strategy is relatively simple:
1. Choose a random index i between 1 and q 2 , and a second random integer k between 1 and log(q).
2. Pass in all the rounds before the i-th overall ball is about to be thrown.
3. When the i-th ball is about to be thrown, make a secret guess that this ball will be thrown in a random bin z chosen among those bins already containing at least k balls prior to this round (or guess any bin if no such bin exists).
We argue that with this strategy, B's chance of success is at least 1/4q 2 , provided that some bin contains more than log(q) balls by the end of the game. Let c j be the total number of balls that are thrown into bins that already have at least j balls in them right before the round when this ball is thrown. Thus c 0 = q 2 and c log(q) ≥ 1 by assumption that a "heavy" bin exists at the end of the game. Also note that c j is an upper bound for the number of bins that have j + 1 balls in them at the end of the game, since for a bin to receive j + 1 balls, some ball has to be thrown into it when the bin already has j balls. For a fixed value of k, B's chance of correctly guessing the bin is at least
. This is because B has chance at least c k q 2 of choosing a ball thrown into a bin with at least k balls, and then has at least chance
of choosing the bin correctly, given that there are at most c k−1 bins with k balls in them even at the end of the game, let alone in some intermediate round. Summing over the different values of k (which each have chance 1/ log(q) of being selected), we thus see that B's chance of success is
as claimed, where we used c 0 = q 2 and c log(q) ≥ 1.
The above lemma immediately gives us a forger B for Case (2) , which succeeds to forge either f 1 or f 2 with probability at least 1/4q 2 > 1/(q log(q)) 2 for that case. As B chooses randomly which strategy to use and one of the two cases must occur with probability at least ε/2, B's chance of success is at least ε 2 min(1/(q log(q)) 2 , 1/4q 2 ) = ε/2(q log(q)) 2 , completing the WCR proof under our two simplifying assumptions.
General Case. Note that our (main) Query Order Assumption (namely that queries to f 3 come before queries to f 1 and f 2 ) is only used rather weakly, in the sense that A could make its queries in any order as long as the query which completes the collision is a query to f 3 . Thus removing this assumption amounts to handling two extra cases, in which collisions are completed with queries to f 1 or f 2 instead of f 3 . It turns out these cases can be handled fairly similarly to the f 3 case. The details are in Appendix B.
Security of SS-NMAC as a PRF
In this section we show that SS-NMAC is a secure PRF if f is a secure PRF. We will prove a stronger property in Section 6; here we give a proof reducing to the security of encrypted CBC-MAC, which gives a weaker result but a better security bound. The precise statement is the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Let f : {0, 1} κ × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n and let H be the SS-NMAC function family. Then, letting q = µ/n and ε = InSec prf f (t, q, qn), we have
Proof.
Let H * be the SS-NMAC construction where
We show that InSec prf H * (t,q, µ) ≤ 5q 2 /2 n by reducing to the security of the "original" encrypted CBC-MAC, which is defined using a function family f of n-bit to n-bit functions by
Let C * be the instance of C where f 1 , f 2 are random functions (namely, f is the set of all functions {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n ). It is known that InSec prf C * (t,q, µ) ≤ q 2 /2 n where still q = µ/n [15] . The security proof in [15] is also easily seen to apply to the case of a three-keyed, "alternating" encrypted CBC-MAC defined by
in which encryptions by f 2 and f 3 alternate. Thus InSec prf C * A (t,q, µ) ≤ q 2 /2 n where C * A is the random function implementation of C A . Note that C A becomes H if each block of input is repeated once and encrypted with a call to f 1 . Thus a distinguisher D for H * can be used to obtain a distinguisher D ′ for C * A : sample a key k 1 to simulate the function f k 1 , then simulate a query x 1 · · · x m of D to the oracle H * by passing
If the oracle is a true instance of C *
A the answers returned to D look exactly as the answers of an oracle to H * , so D's chance of distinguishing correctly is unaffected in that case. If on the other hand the oracle is a random function the answers returned to D are independent random values except when the same input is queried twice to the random oracle, which can happen because of collisions in f k 1 . The chance of a collision in f k 1 when q = µ/n blocks of message are queried and f k 1 is a random function is at most q 2 /2 n , however, so D and D ′ 's distinguishing advantages differ by at most q 2 /2 n . Thus, since D ′ uses twice the message length, we get the desired
Enhanced PRF Security in the Oracle Cipher Model
In this section, we introduce (following [9]) a strictly stronger PRF security notion for block-cipher-based PRFs in the so called oracle cipher model, and show that SS-NMAC has (nearly) birthday "oracle cipher security" when instantiated with a secure PRP. Let H be a function using a fixed-key block cipher f (or a small set of different fixed key block ciphers). Essentially, the oracle cipher model is designed to allow the adversary to view computation transcripts of H, but not including the internals of the block cipher calls. For example, one can imagine that the adversary witnesses a trusted party's computation of H on various inputs, where the trusted party out-sources the block cipher calls to a smart-card, so that the secret keys remain hidden from the adversary. We argue that H is a good random function if, subsequent to viewing a number of such computations, the adversary is unable to distinguish H (queried on new values) from a truly random function.
Let M f be an oracle Turing machine implementing H. Before the game starts random keys are chosen for the block ciphers, a random function h with same domain and range as H is sampled, and a coin flipped to determine whether the adversary will be in the "real world" or "random world". We allow the adversary two types of queries: "transcript" queries and "oracle" queries. When the adversary A makes a transcript query the transcript of the computation M f (x) is returned to A. When the adversary makes a oracle query (oracle queries must be distinct from transcript queries), the adversary either gets H f (x) or h(x) depending on whether it is in the real world or the random world. The adversary wins if it can distinguish the two worlds.
We call the advantage of an adversary at winning this game the oracle cipher PRF security of H, denoted ε oprf . Clearly ε oprf ≥ ε prf for the same number of queries and the same computational resources, since the adversary is free to play the oracle cipher game without making any transcript queries. Let InSec oprf H (t,q, µ) be the maximum ε oprf over all adversaries running in time at most t, making at mostueries of total (padded) length at most µ, where the running time includes the time necessary to run H and M f . (Obviously, InSec oprf H (t,q, µ) implicitly depends on the choice of M .) We have the following theorem showing that the oracle cipher security of SS-NMAC is nearly equivalent to its standard PRF security.
Theorem 4 Let f : {0, 1} κ × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n , let H : {0, 1} 4κ × Dom(H) → {0, 1} n be the SS-NMAC function family, and let M f 1 ,f 2 ,f 3 ,f 4 be the natural oracle Turing implementation of SS-NMAC , which makes 3ℓ + 1 oracle calls to compute H(x) on a padded input of ℓ blocks. Then with respect to this oracle Turing machine, and letting q = µ/n and ε = InSec prf f (t, q, qn), we have
Proof. Let H * be the instantiation of H with a truly random function family instead of with f . We clearly have InSec oprf H (t,q, µ) ≤ InSec oprf H * + 4ε, so it suffices to show InSec oprf H * ≤ 30q 2 log 2 (q)/2 n . We now modify the game like so: for each type of query (transcript and oracle), the adversary is allowed to view the transcript of the computation of H * (x) up to the application of f 4 . Then for a transcript query the actual application of f 4 is shown as part of the transcript to the adversary, whereas for an oracle query the value of the oracle query is simply appended to the transcript (which will be the value of f 4 in the real world, or else simply the value of the random function h). Note the adversary knows in either case which type of query it is witnessing, but cannot independently verify f 4 for oracle queries unless it happens to make another query later (either transcript or oracle) which results in the same input to f 4 . In fact, if the adversary never makes two queries at least one of which is an oracle query that result in the same input to f 4 , the two worlds look exactly alike (because f 4 is uniformly random) and the adversary has zero advantage.
Thus the adversary's advantage is upper bounded by its probability of finding a collision at the input to f 4 with free oracle access to f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , which is in turn upper bounded by the collision resistance of the Shrimpton-Stam compression function when instantiated with random functions. Thus Theorem 1 applied with MAC insecurity 1/2 n gives InSec oprf H * (t,q, µ) ≤ 30q 2 log 2 (q)/2 n , as desired.
Unpredictability vs. Pseudorandomness
Given that our solution is three times slower than CBC-MAC, it is interesting to see if existing block ciphers, such as AES, are indeed more unpredictable than pseudorandom. Notice, even if our n-bit block cipher is completely ideal, it has security ε prf ∼ q 2 /2 n+1 as a one-block PRF, and a much better security ε mac ∼ 1/(2 n − q) as a one-block MAC, where q is the number of input queries issued by the attacker. Also, in theory is is trivial to construct artificial block ciphers which are much more unpredictable than pseudorandom. Unfortunately, existing block ciphers are neither ideal nor artificial. For such "real" block ciphers, to the best of our knowledge, this gap between unpredictability and pseudorandomness has not been researched extensively. In part, this might be due to the cryptanalytic "culture" to call the attack truly "successful" if it actually recovers the secret key, which, obviously, will not demonstrate the gap we are seeking here. We give a (rather weak) example to demonstrate this point. It is well known in complexity theory [22] that no pseudorandom generator with k-bit key can have security more than 2 −k/2 (against non-uniform attackers), even against linear tests. 3 This means that no non-trivial PRF with a k-bit key can have security ε prf ≤ 2 −k/2 , even for q = O(1) (e.g., AES cannot be more than 2 −64 secure, even for q = 2!). In contrast, no such limitation is known for unpredictability, even for exponentially high number of queries q (e.g., for all we know, AES might be almost 2 −128 secure, even for q = 2 60 or higher). However, the above theoretical "separation" is not considered a "real attack", since the best known way to translate this specific 2 −k/2 distinguishing attack to the key recovery attack takes time Ω(2 k ), which is trivial.
We hope that our work will motivate further research to understand the gap between unpredictability and pseudorandomness of existing block ciphers, such as AES. In particular, to answer the question if existing modes, such as CBC-MAC or HMAC, should be replaced by slower, but more "resilient" modes, such as SS-NMAC.
[ 
A Inapplicability of Existing Solutions
Here survey some of the existing approaches, and explain why they do not appear to give a satisfactory answer to our main question.
Reducing to PRF. Given a large number of proposals which are secure when the block cipher is pseudorandom, such as (encrypted) CBC-MAC [4, 15] and HMAC/NMAC [3, 6] , the most natural approach is to first build a (fixed-input-length) PRF out of our block cipher, and then apply the existing machinery. Unfortunately, such generic conversions from unpredictability to pseudorandomness, originating with the revolutionary paper of Goldreich and Levin [11], usually achieve pretty poor parameters. In our setting, the most efficient PRF built from an unpredictable function (or permutation) is the construction of Naor and Reingold [14] , who showed that the Goldreich-Levin construction with a secret inner-product vector r yields a 1-bit PRF with PRF-security ε prf ≈ (ε up · q 2 prf ) 1/2 , where q prf is the number of queries the adversary makes to the PRF and ε up is the security of the block cipher under q = O(q 3 prf /ε 2 prf ) queries. Since q ≤ 2 n , the bound is void when q prf ≥ 2 n/3 or ε prf ≤ 1 2 n/2 , and (in particular) birthday security cannot be achieved. Moreover, to use the resulting 1-bit PRF, we first need to amplify its output length to be at least the security parameter κ, resulting in bad efficiency rate.
Thus, not surprisingly, the route through pseudorandomness is too inefficient. Hence, we turn to other "direct" and efficient VIL-MAC constructions to see if, by "lucky chance", they happen to be secure with unpredictable block ciphers.
CBC Mode. The popular CBC-MAC (and it related variants) is a simple, rate-1 construction of a VIL-MAC from a block cipher. In fact, under the assumption that the block cipher is a PRP, one
HMAC/NMAC. The popular HMAC construction [6] is a heuristic practical variant of the NMAC construction, and is based on the Merkle-Damgard (i.e., cascade) mode of operation. It requires a keyed function family whose output length is at least as large as its key length, which is the case for many block ciphers including AES. In each iteration of the cascade, the current chaining variable (initially, the key) is used as the key for the next iteration. Intuitively, this works for the case of PRFs/PRPs, whose output is (pseudo)random, and can be used as a key. However, it totally fails for the case of UPs, whose output need not be random at all (just unpredictable). For example, it is very simple to construct (artificial) UPs, for which the cascading operation will converge to a known constant on some fixed two-block input. 4 Thus, simple counter-examples of this kind easily dispatch this approach. 5 Hash-then-MAC. A classical approach to extend a domain of a cryptographic primitive is to use an appropriate variable-input-length hash function H to first hash a long message x to a short digest y = H(x), and then to apply a given FIL-MAC (such as UP) to y. The key question is which properties of H suffice for this goal. The first simple observation is that collision-resistant hash function (CRHFs) obviously suffice. However, as explained in the Introduction, this is unsatisfactory both in theory and in practice.
Thus, we would like to base security of the "hash-then-mac" approach on weaker hash functions than CRHFs, which is promising since the hash function H can be keyed. In particular, (almost) universal hash functions are known to be sufficient for the soundness of this approach (this is attributed to [5] by [3] ), when later composed with a FIL-PRF f (such as a PRP). Intuitively, all long as no collisions for H are produced so far, the "outer" f will hide all information about the key of H, allowing one to securely evaluate H on future inputs, without causing collisions with high probability. Unfortunately, it is very crucial that the outer f is pseudorandom, and it is easy to see that this approach will not work, in general, with unpredictable block ciphers. 6 Luckily, as also explained in the Introduction, one can base the security of the "hash-then-mac" approach, even when the outer MAC function is only unpredictable, on a weaker class of hash functions than CRHFs, called Weakly Collision-Resistant (WCR) [6] . Moreover, a shrinking MAC is also a WCR with birthday security [2] . Coupled with a simple domain extension of WCR hash functions via the (strengthened) Merkle-Damgard transform [2] , the question of building VIL-MACs from UPs is essentially equivalent to the question of building either a FIL-WCR hash or a sufficiently shrinking FIL-MAC from a UP. Unfortunately, as we show below, this latter question turns out to be quite non-trivial.
Truncating Block Cipher? Of course, one can always turn a UP (i.e., a length-preserving MAC) into a shrinking MAC (or, perhaps, WCR hash), by simply truncating its output. Unfortunately, this does not work. First, truncating a bits can potentially degrade the unpredictability of the construction by a factor 2 a , meaning that this approach is theoretically sound only for very small a (logarithmic in security parameter). However, since the rate of the resulting construction is n/a, to achieve constant efficiency rate one must truncate at least a constant fraction of bits, making it unsound. Moreover, even if one somehow assumes that such "sufficiently truncated" block cipher is still a "good" MAC, the birthday security will now be with respect to the truncated output length (n − a). E.g., truncating half the bits can give "birthday security" at most 2 n/4 , defeating our goal. Two-Block "Solution"? Given that practical MACs, such as CBC-MAC, are secure with PRPs, one can simply assume away the difficulty of the building a "sufficiently compressing" MAC (or WCR), and assume that two-block versions of these MACs yield a secure two-to-one MAC (or WCR). The "rationale" for this trivialization of the problem is the following. Perhaps, it is "almost as good" to assume that a two-block CBC is a secure MAC (or WCR) as to assume that a one-block version is a MAC (i.e., UP). And, maybe, this strange ad hoc assumption is somehow better than assuming a PRP, which provably implies it. Our belief is that this reasoning is extremely dangerous, and is really not substantiated by any evidence. In fact, we know that it is wrong with (generic) unpredictable block ciphers. Thus, we reject it.
Feistel Network. Another popular approach to double the domain of a primitive is to use the Feistel Network, which iterates the permutation π(x y) = (y f (y) ⊕ x) for several rounds (with different keyed functions f in each round). The celebrated result of Luby and Rackoff [12] showed that already 3 rounds of Feistel would give a PRF from 2n to 2n bits, which could be truncated to n bits by dropping one of the halves. Unfortunately, this argument does not translate if we replace a PRP by a (general) UP. An and Bellare [2] showed that three rounds of Feistel fail to preserve unpredictability (or yield WCR), and Dodis and Puniya [9] extended this attack even to O(log κ) rounds, where κ is the security parameter. On a positive, [9] showed that super-logarithmic number ω(log κ) of Feistel rounds indeed allows one to construct a two-to-one MAC (and WCR) from an unpredictable block cipher. Unfortunately, this results in super-constant rate ω(log κ), making this construction somewhat inefficient for practice. More significantly, the security of this construction proven by [9] was only ε mac = O(ε up · q 6 mac ), where q mac is the number of queries made by the MAC-forging adversary, meaning that it can only be secure for at most 2 n/6 messages, which is unacceptable for n = 128. To summarize, the work of [9] gives the first reasonable construction of a VIL-MAC from an UP, but has very poor security and super-constant rate.
Enhanced CBC Mode. This mode was recently proposed by Dodis et al. [8] . The authors made the surprisingly simple observation that the function h(x y) = f 1 (x) ⊕ f 2 (y) is a two-to-one, rate-2 WCR hash function, assuming f 1 and f 2 are two independent UPs. This immediately gives a rate-2 VIL-MAC from UPs, which is very efficient, and is the first (and only) constant-rate solution to Question 1 known prior to this work. Unfortunately, the security of this WCR function is O(ε up · q 4 ), since the UP forger has to guess all four queries f 1 (x), f 1 (x ′ ), f 2 (y), f 2 (y ′ ) which are "responsible" for the collision h(x y) = h(x ′ y ′ ), and predict the last value in the quartet as the XOR of the three prior values. Moreover, it is easy to see that this bound is actually tight. Thus, the construction can only be secure for at most 2 n/4 messages, again making it fall short of our goal of obtaining security up to 2 n/2 asked in Question 2. In fact, this question of achieving "birthday security" 2 n/2 was the main open question posed in [8] , which we resolve in this work.
B Full Proof of Theorem 1
This section contains the proof of Theorem 1. As explained in the proof outline, A is a collision-finding adversary for F with oracle access to f 1 , f 2 , f 3 makingueries to each f i ; B simulates A, interrupting the computation to forge one of the f i 's at some un-queried point. We must exhibit a strategy for B such that B's chance of forging is at least ε/10q 2 log 2 (q) where ε is A's probability of finding a collision, and such that B's computational overhead is O(q 2 n). We assume that A makes all the queries necessary to compute its collision.
At the start B chooses a random integer between 1 and 10, uniformly. Depending on this number B attempts one of 10 different types of forgeries. The types of forgeries are described below. All random choices are made uniformly in the specified domain.
Type 1: B chooses random indices i < j between 1 and q. When A makes its j-th query x j to f 1 B guesses the answer will be f 1 (x i ) where x i was the i-th query to f 1 .
Type 2: B chooses random indices i < j between 1 and q. When A makes its j-th query y j to f 2 B guesses the answer will be f 2 (y i ) where y i was the i-th query to f 2 .
Type 3: B chooses random indices i < j between 1 and q. When A makes its j-th query z j to f 3 B guesses the answer will be f 3 (z i ) where z i was the i-th query to f 3 .
Type 4: B chooses random indices i < j between 1 and q. When A makes its j-th query z j to f 3 B guesses the answer will be z j ⊕ z i ⊕ f 3 (z i ) where z i was the i-th query to f 3 .
Type 5: B chooses a random integer ℓ between 1 and q 2 and a random integer k between 1 and log(q). As A makes queries B keeps track of the pairs (x, y) for which A knows f 1 (x), f 2 (y) in a sequence S. Pairs are added to S as A makes queries: when A makes a query x to f 1 , say, B adds the pairs {(x, y) : A has already queried f 2 (y)} to S, with the pairs ordered lexicographically by y, and symmetrically when A makes queries f 2 on a new point y. The value of pair (x, y) ∈ S is f 1 (x) ⊕ f 2 (x). When B sees that A's latest query will result in the length of S becoming ≥ ℓ it finds the pair (x, y) that will be the ℓ-th pair of S (it can do this without seeing the answer to the query), chooses a value d uniformly in the set c = {c ∈ {0, 1} n : there are at least k pairs in S of value c}, and guesses the answer of the query by guessing the value of (x, y) will be d (namely guesses f 1 (x) = d ⊕ f 2 (y) if A's query was f 1 (x) and guesses f 2 (y) = d ⊕ f 1 (x) if A's query was f 2 (y)). No guessing occurs if C is empty.
Type 6: B chooses a random integer ℓ between 1 and q 2 and a random integer k between 1 and log(q). As A makes queries B keeps track of the pairs (x, z) for which A knows f 1 (x), f 3 (z) in a sequence T , which is constructed like the sequence S of the Type 5 strategy. Like for the sequence S, the value of pair (x, z) ∈ T is f 1 (x) ⊕ f 3 (z). When B sees that A's latest query will result in the length of T becoming ≥ ℓ it finds the pair (x, z) that will be the ℓ-th pair of T , chooses a value d uniformly in the set C = {c ∈ {0, 1} n : there are at least k pairs in T of value c}, and guesses the answer of the query by guessing the value of (x, z) will be d. No guessing occurs if C is empty.
Type 7: B chooses a random integer ℓ between 1 and q 2 and a random integer k between 1 and log(q). As A makes queries B keeps track of the pairs (y, z) for which A knows f 2 (x), f 3 (z) in a sequence U , which is constructed like the sequences S, T of the Type 4 and Type 5 strategies. The value of pair (y, z) ∈ U is f 2 (y) ⊕ z ⊕ f 3 (z). When B sees that A's latest query will result in the length of U becoming ≥ ℓ it finds the pair (y, z) that will be the ℓ-th pair of U , chooses a value d uniformly in the set C = {c ∈ {0, 1} n : there are at least k pairs in U of value c}, and guesses the answer of the query by guessing the value of (y, z) will be d. No guessing occurs if C is empty.
Type 8: B chooses a random index i between 1 and q. When A makes its i-th query to f 1 , say f 1 (x), B chooses one element at random from the set Q = {(y, z, x ′ , y ′ ) : f 2 (y) ⊕ z ⊕ f 3 (z) = F (x ′ y ′ ) and A has made the queries f 2 (y), f 3 (z) and the queries necessary to compute F (x ′ y ′ )} (if the set is nonempty) and guesses the answer to f 1 (x) will be f 2 (y) ⊕ z.
Type 9: B chooses a random index i between 1 and q. When A makes its i-th query to f 2 , say f 2 (y), B chooses one element at random from the set R = {(x, z, x ′ , y ′ ) : f 1 (x) ⊕ f 3 (z) = F (x ′ y ′ ) and A has made the queries f 1 (x), f 3 (z) and the queries necessary to compute F (x ′ y ′ )} (if the set is nonempty) and guesses the answer to f 2 (y) will be f 1 (x) ⊕ z.
Type 10: B chooses random indices j < i between 1 and q. Let z i , z j be the i-th and j-th queries that
We argue that with this strategy B's chance of forging one of the f i 's successfully is at least ε/10q 2 log 2 (q). Let Coll be the event that A finds a collision, and let Forge be the event that B successfully forges. We define 10 events 
The events Ev 1 , . . . , Ev 10 will be defined in terms of the following events Win 1 , . . . , Win 10 :
• Win 1 is the event that A queries f 1 at distinct points x, x ′ such that f 1 (x) = f 1 (x ′ ).
• Win 2 is the event that A queries f 2 at distinct points y, y ′ such that f 2 (y) = f 2 (y ′ ).
• Win 3 is the event that A queries f 3 at distinct points z, z ′ such that f 3 (z) = f 3 (z ′ ).
• Win 4 is the event that A queries f 3 at distinct points z, z ′ such that z ⊕ f 3 (z) = z ′ ⊕ f 3 (z ′ ).
• Win 5 is the event that, when A is finished querying, there exists a z ∈ {0, 1} n such that |{(x, y) :
• Win 6 is the event that, when A is finished querying, there exists a v ∈ {0, 1} n such that |{(x, z) :
• Win 7 is the event that, when A is finished querying, there exists a w ∈ {0, 1} n such that |{(y, z) :
• Win 8 is the event that A obtains a collision such that the last query made by A to obtain the collision is a query to f 1 .
• Win 9 is the event that A obtains a collision such that the last query made by A to obtain the collision is a query to f 2 .
• Win 10 is the event that A obtains a collision such that the last query made by A to obtain the collision is a query to f 3 .
Now we define
Ev i = Win i ¬ j<i Win i for i = 1 . . . 10. Because Coll =⇒ Win 8 ∨ Win 9 ∨ Win 10 it is obvious that Coll =⇒ Ev 1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ev 10 . We now show that Pr[Forge|Ev i ∧ Type i ] ≥ 1/q 2 log 2 (q) for i = 1 . . . 10.
Proposition 1 Pr[Forge|Ev
Proof. Say that B selects its Type 1 strategy and that A queries f 1 on two different points x, x ′ such that f 1 (x) = f 1 (x ′ ). For its Type 1 strategy B selects i < j uniformly in {1, . . . , q} and guesses that f 1 (x i ) = f 1 (x j ) where x i , x j are the i-th and j-th query made by A to f 1 . Then there is chance at least 
Proof.
Let S = (p 1 , p 2 , . . .) be the sequence described in the Type 5 strategy, where each p i is a pair (x, y) such that A has queried f 1 (x), f 2 (y). The value of a pair p i = (x, y) is f 1 (x) ⊕ f 2 (x), and B attempts to guess the value of the ℓ-th pair of the sequence at the moment when its value is about to be learned. For this B's strategy is to guess the answer uniformly among all numbers in {0, 1} n that are already the values of at least k pairs in S, where k was selected randomly by B between 1 and log(q) at the start of the attack.
Each query by A adds a group of pairs to S. The pairs in a group either all have their x-coordinates or y-coordinates in common. When Ev 5 occurs f 1 -and f 2 -collisions do not occur (by definition of Ev 5 , it cannot occur if Win 1 or Win 2 ) so the pairs in a group all have different values. We are now exactly in the case discussed under Case (2) in Section 4.2, where it is shown that B's chance of forgery is at least 1/4q 2 .
The following two propositions have the same proof as Propositions 5:
Assume that the adversary obtains a collision where the last query needed to obtain the collision is a query x 0 made to f 1 and that ¬ i<7 Win i . Let (x 0 , y 0 ), (x 1 , y 1 ) be the two colliding inputs. If x 0 = x 1 then f 1 (x 0 ) = f 1 (x 1 ) which implies f 3 (z 0 ) = f 3 (z 1 ) where z 0 = f 1 (x 0 ) ⊕ f 2 (y 0 ) and z 1 = f 1 (x 1 ) ⊕ f 3 (z 1 ); then either z 0 = z 1 and Win 3 , a contradiction, or z 0 = z 1 and f 2 (y 0 ) = f 2 (y 1 ) but y 0 = y 1 , so Win 2 , another contradiction. Thus we can assume that x 0 = x 1 . This implies the tuple (y 0 , z 0 , x 1 , y 1 ) is in the set Q described in the Type 8 strategy. Note that f 1 (x 0 ) = f 2 (y 0 ) ⊕ z 0 .
With its Type 8 strategy B wins if it makes its guess on the query f 1 (x 0 ) and if it chooses a tuple (y, z, x ′ , y ′ ) ∈ Q such that f 2 (y) ⊕ z = f 2 (y 0 ) ⊕ z 0 . Since B has chance 1/q of making its guess on the Proof. Assume that the adversary obtains a collision where the last query needed to obtain the collision is a query z 0 made to f 3 and that ¬( i<9 Win i ). Let (x 0 , y 0 ), (x 1 , y 1 ) be the two colliding inputs, where z 0 = f 1 (x 0 ) ⊕ f 2 (y 0 ). As argued in Section 4.2, z 1 := f 1 (x 1 ) ⊕ f 2 (y 1 ) is distinct from z 0 , because otherwise f 1 (x 0 ) = f 1 (x 1 ) and consequently f 2 (y 0 ) = f 2 (y 1 ), which would imply either Win 1 or Win 2 , a contradiction. Thus B has chance 1/ q 2 that z i = z 0 and z j = z 1 . To win B moreover needs to choose (x i , y i ) = (x 0 , y 0 ), which B has chance ≥ 1/ log(q) since Bin(z 0 ) ≤ log(q) by ¬Win 5 , and likewise B has chance ≥ 1/ log(q) of choosing (x j , y j ) = (x 1 , y 1 ). Thus B's chance of winning is at least 1/q 2 log 2 (q).
C Security of SS as a MAC
In this section we investigate the MAC security of the Shrimpton-Stam (SS) compression function. We show that SS has MAC security εq 4 if the underlying block cipher has MAC security ε. Thus SS has some MAC security (in particular, cannot be trivially broken trivially like the compression function of CBC-MAC or enhanced CBC-MAC [8] ), but not birthday security. Moreover, as we show with an artificially constructed MAC for which SS has security ∼ εq 4 , the bound is essentially tight. The results of this section underscore that the crucial ingredients of Theorem 2 are the MAC security of f 4 and the WCR security of SS, not the MAC security of SS itself. Our counterexample also shows a nice example of a compression function which is easier to forge than to find a collision for. Proof. Let A be a MAC adversary for F achieving advantage ε running in time t and makingueries. We show there is a MAC adversary B for f running in time t + O(q 2 n), making at mostueries and achieving advantage ε/3q 4 . A makesueries F (x 1 , y 1 ) , . . ., F (x q , y q ) and then announces a forgery for F (x q + 1, y q + 1). Let z i = f 1 (x i ) + f 2 (y i ) for i <= q + 1. As A makes queries, B computes the answers using its access to f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , except for the moment when B decides to make its forgery. (We use the standard device that B uses its oracle f k for one of the f i 's, choosing which one at random, while it samples two keys to simulate the other two f i 's on its own; since only of the f i 's counts for valid forgeries, this introduces a factor 1 3 into B's probability of success.) B forges by using one of the following six types of strategies with equal probability: Type 1: B anticipates that F (x q + 1, y q + 1) will involve a fresh query to f 3 , namely that z q+1 will be distinct from z 1 , . . ., z q . Then B simply forgers f 3 on z q+1 by predicting the answer will be w +f 1 (x q+1 ). This strategy fails if z q+1 was already made as a query to f 3 , succeeds otherwise. (So basically we can assume that z q+1 already appeared at some point as a query to f 3 , or else B is successful.) Type 2: B anticipates that f 3 (z q+1 ) was already made as a query to f 3 but that f 1 (x q+1 ) was not already made as a query to f 1 , Then B forges by computing f 2 (y q+1 ) and guessing that f 1 (x q+1 ) = f 2 (x q+1 ) + z i for some randomly selected i ≤ q. Then if f 3 (z q+1 ) was already made and f 1 (x q+1 ) hadn't already been made, B's chance of success is 1/q times A's chance of success (because there is 1/q chance of choosing the right z i ).
Type 3: symmetric to type 2, but anticipating that f 2 (y q+1 ) was not already made as a query instead of f 1 (x q+1 ).
For the remaining types, B anticipates that all three queries f 1 (x q+1 ), f 2 (y q+1 ) and f 3 (z q+1 ) will all have been made by the time A announces its forgery. Note that in this case, z q+1 = f 1 (x i ) + f 2 (y i ) for some i ≤ q, and either x i = x q+1 or y i = y q+1 (and possibly both). To cover the cases, B play three different types:
Type 4: B anticipates that x i = x q+1 and y i = y q+1 . Then since the query f 2 (y q+1 ) was already made there is some j ≤ q, j = i, such that y j = y q+1 . So f 2 (y i ) = z i + f 1 (x i ) = z q+1 + f 1 (x q+1 ) = f 2 (y q+1 ) = f 2 (y j ). Therefore there is a collision in f 2 , and B does its forgery by guessing a collision for f 2 (with probability 1/q 2 of success if a collision does occur).
Type 5: B anticipates that y i = y q+1 and x i = x q+1 . Symmetric to type 4, B guesses a collision for f 1 .
Type 6: B anticipates that x i = x q+1 , y i = y q+1 . Let j be the smallest index such that x j = x q+1 , let h be the smallest index such that y h = y q+1 . Also let m be the smallest index such that x m = x i and b be the smallest index such that y b = y i . Then f 1 (x m ) + f 2 (y b ) = f 1 (x j ) + f 2 (y h ), so any one of the four values f 1 (x m ), f 2 (y b ), f 1 (x j ), f 2 (y h ) can be inferred from the three others. Also note that m = j and b = h, since we are assuming x i = x q+1 and y i = y q+1 . Then B guesses the sets {m, j} and {h, b} (two distinct integers each) and does the obvious forgery on the query corresponding to the highest of the four integers {m, j, h, b}. For example, if b is the highest, B guesses that f 2 (y b ) = f 1 (x m ) + f 2 (y h ) + f 1 (x j ). It is possible, say, that two of the integers {m, j, h, b} are both highest (say j = b), in which case B has the choice of which of those two queries to make first and which to forge (if j = b, say, B could compute f 1 (x j ) and forge f 2 (y b ) or compute f 2 (y b ) and forge f 1 (x j )). The chance of guessing the four indices correctly (conditioned on the assumptions of this strategy) is 1/q 4 .
B's overall chance of success of p/18q 4 follows from the fact that one of the six scenarios anticipated by B in its strategies must occur, and the worst chance it has of winning for any scenario is 1/q 4 , if that scenario occurs and it is playing the appropriate game, coupled with the fact that a successful forgery is only a forgery for the real f k with probability
